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Abstract
This paper aims at shedding light on the social gradient by studying the relationship
between socioeconomic status (SES) and provision of health care. Using administrative data
on services provided by General Practitioners (GPs) in Norway over a ve year period (2008-
12), we analyse the quantity, composition and value of services provided by the GPs according
to patientsSES measured by education, income or ethnicity. Our data allow us to control
for a wide set of patient and GP characteristics. To account for (unobserved) heterogeneity,
we limit the sample to patients with a specic disease, diabetes type 2, and estimate a
model with GP xed e¤ects. Our results show that patients with low SES visit the GPs
more often, but the value of services provided per visit is lower. The composition of services
varies with SES, where patients with low education and African or Asian ethnicity receive
more medical tests but shorter consultations, whereas patients with low income receive both
shorter consultations and fewer tests. Thus, our results show that GPs di¤erentiate services
according to SES, but give no clear evidence for a social gradient in health care provision.
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1 Introduction
Richer, better-educated people live longer than poorer, less-educated people. Lower mortality
and morbidity is associated with almost any positive indicator of socioeconomic status (SES);
a relationship that is usually referred to as the social gradient. While the positive relationship
between SES and health is well established, the mechanisms behind this relationship are less well
understood.1 In order to explain the social gradient, many studies have focused on di¤erences in
individual behaviour (e.g., smoking, drinking) or environmental exposure either in physicial sense
(e.g., pollution, workplace conditions) or in social sense (e.g., residence area, family conditions)
related to SES.2 In this paper, we focus on a third potential source for the positive association
between SES and health, which has received less attention in the literature on SES, namely
health care provision.
Health care provision may have a decisive impact on the distribution of health in the society.
Since the medical treatment directly inuences individualshealth through the extent to which
their health is restored, it may be a prime source for di¤erences in health across individuals.
Obviously, if physicians o¤er less (or worse) medical treatment to patients with low SES, then
the provision of health care is likely to reinforce health inequalities in the population. On the
contrary, if patients with low SES receive more (or better) care, then health care provision may
contribute to reducing the social gradient. In addition, access to health care may vary according
to patientsSES and thus have an impact on the distribution of health across individuals. Since
policy makers to a large extent design the nancing scheme and regulate the provision of health
care, knowledge about how medical care is allocated according to patientsSES is of great policy
relevance.
We investigate the relationship between SES and health care provision by studying physi-
cians provision of medical services to patients that di¤er in SES. Having an administrative
dataset with detailed information about all services provided by General Practitioners (GPs)
in Norway, we analyse the quantity, the composition, and the value of health care provided by
the GPs to their patients. SES is measured by patientseducational level, income level, and
ethnicity (i.e., African or Asian). Our data cover a ve year period from 2008 to 2012, and
1See, for instance, the extensive literature review by Cutler et al. (2008), or the study by Adams et al. (2003)
on the causal paths between health, wealth, and education.
2See, for instance, the studies by Borg and Kristensen (2000), Contoyannis and Jones (2004), Balia and Jones
(2008).
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include patient and GP identiers, which allow us to control for a wide set of patient and GP
characteristics. When estimating the e¤ect of SES on the provision of health care, it is highly
important to also control for unobserved patient and GP heterogeneity that may inuence the
GPs provision of care. For instance, patients with low SES tend to have poorer health than
others, and may therefore receive more medical care from their GP simply due to illness severity.
In order to reduce unobserved patient heterogeneity, we restrict our sample to patients with a
specic diagnosis, namely diabetes type 2. This is a highly common disease in the population
that is treated by more than 90 percent of the GPs in our sample. To account for GP hetero-
geneity that may inuence the provision of medical care, we estimate a model with GP xed
e¤ects that control for time invariant characteristics, such as treatment skills, degree of altruism,
geographical location, etc.3
Based on this empirical approach, we nd mixed results regarding the provision of health
care according to patientsSES. On one hand, the GPs have more frequent visits from patients
with low SES. On the other hand, the GPstotal income per visit is lower for patients with low
SES, which suggests they receive less services measured in terms of value. These results hold
irrespective of whether SES is measured by patientseducation, income or ethnicity. Considering
the composition of services, we nd that patients with low education tend to receive more medical
tests but shorter consultations (fewer prolonged consultations). The same pattern is present
regarding ethnicity. However, patients with low income receive both shorter consultations and
fewer medical tests. Thus, our results show that GPs di¤erentiate their medical treatment
according to patients SES, but provide no clear evidence for a social gradient in the overall
health care provision.
To develop economic intuition for the empirical ndings regarding the composition of services,
we consider a simple theory model with a GP that o¤ers two types of treatment (medical
testing and consultation) to patients who derive utility from the health gains generated by
the treatment. Assuming that the e¢ ciency of consultation increases with the patients SES
(due to, for instance, communication skills), our theory model conrms that it is optimal for
the GP to o¤er more medical testing but shorter consultation to patients with lower SES if
the following conditions are fullled. First, the GP has to be (partially) altruistic taking into
account the patients utility gain from medical treatment. If the GP is purely prot-motivated,
3For instance, Grytten and Sørensen (2003) report ndings that show substantial variation between GPs in their
service provision. This illustrates the importance of controlling for (observed and unobserved) GP characteristics.
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then she will o¤er the same treatment irrespective of the patients SES. Second, the two types of
treatment are substitutable or independent in the health production function. If consultation and
medical testing are strongly complementary in the health production function, then patients with
higher SES receive both longer consultations and more medical tests. Our results indicate that
consultation and medical tests are substitutes when measuring SES by education or ethnicity,
which seems plausible as communication skill are likely to be correlated with these measures.
The literature on socioeconomic status and health is vast (see, e.g., Cutler et al., 2008).
However, our study relates to the part of this literature that focuses on the provision of health
care. One strand of literature focuses on utilisation and access to health care. For instance, Roos
et al. (2005) nd that poor people in urban areas in Canada with ambulatory care sensitive
(ACS) conditions have both more physician visits and hospitalisation related to ambulatory care.
Dunlop et al. (2000) using national survey data nd, after adjusting for di¤erences in health
need, that Canadians with lower incomes and fewer years of schooling visit GPs at a higher
rate but specialist at a lower rate than those with moderate or high incomes and higher levels
of education attained. Moreover, Kapur et al. (2004) examine the e¤ects of SES on medical
care expenditures in two US Medicare managed care plans, and nd that education, income,
and wealth all a¤ected medical care expenditures, although the e¤ects of these variables di¤ered
across expenditure categories.4
Another strand focuses on inequity in health care utilisation. This literature analyses the
distribution of GP and specialist visits separately. The key concept is inequity  i.e., inequalities
remaining after adjusting for needs for health care. Therefore, all available (survey) information
on patient need is included as controls. In comparative studies, di¤erences are detected between
countries with di¤erent health care systems, but in most developed countries, specialist visits is
distributed in favour of high-income individuals while GP visits are more equitably distributed
(Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004; Bago dUva and Jones, 2009; Devaux, 2013). This also
holds for Norway (Grasdal and Monstad, 2011).5
The key contributions of our paper to the existing literature are the following. First, we
use public register data with detailed information about the medical services provided by the
4There are also recent studies on the relationship between SES and waiting times, as a measure of access to
health care; see, e.g., Kaarboe and Carlsen (2014), Monstad et al. (2014).
5There are also some related papers focusing on GPs provision of care to diabetes patients; see Iezzi et al.
(2014) and Scott et al. (2009). While these papers are mainly concerned with the e¤ect of nancing schemes on
the provision of care, they also report ndings on di¤erences in the distribution of services across patients.
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GPs to their patients, as well as information on patient and GP characteristics. The existing
literature is mainly based on survey data where this information is self-reported by the patient
and/or the GP. Second, the register data contains information over time with GP and patient
identiers, which enables the use of panel data methods, including GP xed e¤ects to control
for (unobserved) time-invariant heterogeneity. Having access to monthly data with information
on the medical services provided by the GPs, gives more time variation than one usually gets
with survey data. Third, our data cover virtually all patients and GPs in Norway, and are thus
highly representative for the population. Finally, we o¤er a theoretical explanation for the GPs
provision of health care according to patientsSES.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our theory model
and analysis of physician incentives. In Section 3 we describe the data and present descriptive
statistics. In Section 4 we set out the empirical model, and in Section 5 we report our results.
Finally, in Section 6 we o¤er some concluding remarks.
2 Model
Consider a patient that visits a physician for medical treatment. The patient derives utility
U (b) from the health gain from treatment, b, where U () is increasing and strictly concave.
The physician o¤ers two types of medical treatment; consultation and medical testing.6 We
assume that the health gain from treatment is given by a health production function b (q; ),
where q is the quality-adjusted quantity of medical consultation and  is the quantity of medical
testing. The health gain from treatment is increasing in both treatment types (bq > 0; b >
0), but at a decreasing rate (bqq < 0; b < 0). However, consultation and medical testing
may be complements (bq > 0), substitutes (bq < 0) or independent services (bq = 0) in health
production. For example, if longer consultation improves the accuracy of medical diagnosing,
fewer tests might be needed. In this case consultation and medical testing are substitutes. On
the other hand, if the quality of the consultation is improved by medical testing, then it is likely
that the two medical treatments are complements. Finally, we assume that the quality-adjusted
quantity of medical consultation depends on two factors: the length of the consultation, c,
and the socioeconomic status (SES) of the patient, . Our key assumption is that a patient
6The physician can of course also refer the patient to a specialist or a hospital, but here we focus on medical
treatment provided by a primary care physician.
5
with higher SES is better able to communicate the full details of his disease symptoms to the
physician, thereby increasing the quality of the consultation for a given consultation length.7
For simplicity, we assume that these two factors interact multiplicatively, such that q = c.
By dening u (c;  ; ) := U (b (q; )), where q = c, it is straightforward to show that uc =
Ubbq > 0, u = Ubb > 0, ucc =
 
Ubbb
2
q + Ubbqq

2 < 0 and u = Ubbb2 + Ubb < 0. Less
straightforward, and more interesting, are the second-order cross partial derivatives of u with
respect to c,  and , which are given as follows:
uc =

c
u = (Ubbb bq + Ubbq ) ; (1)
uc =
 
Ubbb
2
q + Ubbqq

q + Ubbq =
1

(uccc+ uc) : (2)
From (1) we see that a su¢ cient condition for consultation length and medical testing to be
substitutes in the patients utility function (i.e., uc < 0) is that q and  are substitutes in the
health production function (i.e., bq < 0). In this case, higher SES will reduce the marginal
utility of medical testing. Notice that bq < 0 is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for
this result. Since higher SES increases (all else equal) the health gain through higher quality
of consultation, the marginal utility of medical testing is reduced also if bq is either zero of
positive (but su¢ ciently small), as long as U is strictly concave in b.
The sign of (2) is also ambiguous, because of two counteracting e¤ects. On the one hand,
since higher SES increases the quality, and thereby the health gain, of a given consultation
length, this contributes to reducing the marginal utility of longer consultations whenever U or
b is strictly concave. On the other hand, higher SES also makes consultations more productive,
which contributes to increasing the marginal utility of consultation length. The rst e¤ect
dominates the second if u is su¢ ciently concave in c. More precisely, uc > (<) 0 if  < (>) 1,
where  :=  ucccuc measures the relative degree of concavity of u with respect to c.
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In line with standard assumptions in the literature on physician behaviour, our physician
is assumed to be partly altruistic and care about both patient utility and her own income (or
7 In addition, a higher-educated patient might also be able to better understand the physicians diagnosis and
possible consequences.
8 If, for example, u is logarithmic in c, the two e¤ects cancel each other out and  = 1, implying uc = 0.
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prots). More specically, the physician payo¤ function is assumed to be given by
 = u (c;  ; ) + pcc+ p  G (c; ) ; (3)
where  2 (0; 1) is the physicians degree of altruism towards the patient, pc is the fee (price)
received per unit of consultation time and p is the fee received per unit of medical testing. The
physicians costs of medical treatment are given by a convex function G (), where G (0) = 0;
Gc > 0; G > 0; Gcc  0, G  0. Interpreting the costs of consultation and testing as time
costs, it also makes sense to assume that Gc > 0.
We assume that the physician observes the patients SES when selecting the optimal mix
of medical treatment. In this case the optimal medical treatment for a patient with SES 
equates marginal benet with marginal cost along each treatment dimension, as indicated by
the following rst-order conditions:9
@
@c
= uc + pc  Gc = 0; (4)
@
@
= u + p  G = 0: (5)
The e¤ect of SES on the optimally chosen treatment mix is found by totally di¤erentiating
(4)-(5) and applying the Implicit Function Theorem, yielding:
@c
@
=   1


@2
@@c
@2
@c@
@2
@@
@2
@2
 =  
1

[uc (u  G )  u (uc  Gc )] ; (6)
@
@
=   1


@2
@c2
@2
@@c
@2
@c@
@2
@@
 =  
1

[u (ucc  Gcc)  uc (uc  Gc )] ; (7)
9The second-order conditions are given by
ucc  Gcc < 0;
u  G < 0
and
(ucc  Gcc) (u  G )  (uc  Gc )2 > 0;
which we assume to be all satised.
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where
 :=

@2
@c2
@2
@c@
@2
@@c
@2
@2
 = (ucc  Gcc) (u  G )  (uc  Gc )2 > 0:
The following proposition presents a pair of precisely dened su¢ cient conditions for which the
signs of (6) and (7) are unambiguous:
Proposition 1 Suppose that bq  0 and   1. In this case higher SES leads to longer
consultations and a lower quantity of medical testing.
The proof of the Proposition follows from a straightforward inspection of (6) and (7). It is
worth stressing that the two conditions given in the Proposition are su¢ cient but not necessary.
To see this, consider the special case of bq = 0 and  = 1. As long as patient utility is strictly
concave in health, higher SES is still associated with longer consultations and fewer test. Higher
SES directly increases the health gain by increasing the value of a given medical consultation,
which reduces the marginal utility of medical testing and the physician optimally chooses a lower
number of tests. This dampens the initial health gain, and therefore increases the marginal
utility of consultation length, which is correspondingly increased. Thus, higher SES implies a
substitution away from medical testing and towards longer consultations.10 This substitution
e¤ect is reinforced if consultation and testing are substitutes in the health production function
(i.e., bq < 0), and it is even further reinforced if  < 1, which implies that higher SES directly
induces the physician to increase the length of the consultation because of higher consultation
productivity(i.e., uc > 0).
The above Proposition denes a regime where higher SES leads to longer consultations and
fewer tests. This is obviously not the only possible regime. For example, even if consultation
and testing are substitutes in the health production function (bq < 0), the results might be
completely reversed (i.e., @c=@ < 0 and @=@ > 0) if  is su¢ ciently large (above 1).
If uc < 0, higher SES directly gives the physician an incentive to reduce the length of the
consultation. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong it will outweigh the other e¤ects and lead to a
substitution away from consultation length and towards more medical testing.
Finally, higher SES might not involve substitution between consultation and medical testing.
A possible outcome is that patients with higher SES receive both longer consultations and
10By continuity, such a substitution also appears for a set of parameter values in the neighbourhood of bq = 0
and  = 1, including parameters that yield bq > 0 and  > 1.
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more tests. In our model, this is a possible outcome if consultation and testing are strongly
complementary in the health production function, such that bq > 0 and su¢ ciently large to
ensure u > 0 and uc > Gc . If, in addition,   1 (implying uc  0), patients with higher
SES will unambiguously receive better treatment, in the form of longer consultations and more
medical testing.
3 Institutional background
Norway has a National Health Service (NHS) system mainly nanced through general taxation.
The provision of primary health care is mainly the responsibility of municipalities. In order to
provide services to patients within the NHS, General Practitioners (GPs) need a contract with
a municipality. The number of GPs within each municipality is regulated by the Norwegian
Directorate of Health based on demographic measures. Currently, there are more than 4000
public GPs (called "fastleger" in Norwegian) that have a contract with the municipalities.
Notably, almost 95 percent of the GPs in Norway are self-employed with their own practise.11
Thus, the GPsincome are basically equivalent to the surpluses (or decits) they obtain from
providing medical treatment to patients. However, prices cannot be set by the individual GP,
but are set by the government or in negotiations between the government and the medical
association. In Norway, GPs receive third-party payments that are a combination of capitation
and fee-for-service. The capitation part is paid by the municipalities as a at payment (about
NOK 400 per year) per individual on the GPs list. The fee-for-service part is paid by the
National Insurance Scheme and based on a wide set of services provided by the GP, including
consultation, laboratory tests, medical procedures, etc. In addition, the GPs collect copayments
from patients for the consultation and various services that are provided during the consultation.
All individuals in Norway have the right to be listed with a public GP in their municipality of
residence. Individuals can switch GP (at most twice per calender year) within the municipality.12
The GPs can decide the size of their list, but are required to have at least 500 patients and not
more than 2500 patients. If a GPs list is full (closed), then the GP can potentially turn down
new patients. However, if the list is not full (open), then the GPs will be automatically assigned
new patients that apply for being listed with them.
11The residual ve percent of the GPs are publicly employed with regular salary contracts paid by the munici-
palities.
12Of course, if individuals move to another municipality they are also allowed to switch GP across municipalities.
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4 Data
4.1 Data sources and variables
In order to study whether GPs o¤er di¤erent services to patients with di¤erent SES, we use
administrative registry data from several sources. From Statistics Norway we have obtained
information about patient characteristics, including education, income, ethnicity, etc. Data on
GP characteristics are found in the Regular GP database13 and include information on GP age,
gender, specialisation, and patient list information. Finally, from the KUHR register, which is
established to settle fee-for-service payments to GPs from the National Insurance Scheme, we
obtain information on the services provided by the GPs.14 This register records every GP service
that generates a fee, and thus enables us to observe the number of patient visits, the patients
diagnosis (i.e., ICPC-code), and the mix of services provided to each patient, such as medical
tests, prolonged consultations, etc. Importantly, these data include patient and GP identiers,
which enable us to merge information about services provided by GPs to individual patient and
GP characteristics.
The data cover all GPs and virtually all GP consultations in Norway.15 When analysing
provision of health care, a main issue is to control for unobserved heterogeneity in illness severity,
which may generate di¤erences in medical treatment among patients. A common way to deal
with this issue is to focus on a specic group of patients with the same diagnosis. In this paper
we select a sample consisting of patients diagnosed with diabetes type II (ICPC-code T90)
during the ve-year period 2008-2012. These patients may have visited the GP for other reasons
than diabetes, so we restrict the consultations analysed to those where diabetes is recorded as
the main diagnosis, which gives us in total 1,327,461 consultations. The reasons for selecting
patient with diabetes type II are two-fold. First, this is a very common disease, which implies
that almost every GP treat this type of patients. In our sample more than 90 percent of the GPs
are represented. Second, diabetes type II is a chronic disease that is almost exclusively treated
in primary care.16 Thus, the GP is the main provider of health care and therefore of crucial
importance for this patient group. In addition, there is less concern about sample selection
13See http://www.nsd.uib.no/velferd/fastlege/.
14KUHR (Kontroll og utbetaling av helserefusjon) is a public register administrated by the Norwegian Health
Administration (HELFO), which is a subordinate of the Directorate of Health.
15Reimbursement claims are almost exclusively sent electronically. Claims sent on paper are not included in
the registry data, but amounted to merely 1 percent of all claims in 2011 (www.ssb.no/helse/statistikker).
16This is according the national medical guidelines see www.helsedirektoratet.no.
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related to some patients (for instance, patients with high SES) demanding specialist care to
treat their diabetes.
From this rich data set we generate dependent variables of the services provided by the GPs.
Two dummy variables reect tests used to monitor the condition: (i) a test showing the average
plasma glucose concentration over a period of 6-8 weeks (HbA1c) and (ii) a blood glucose test to
check the current state (BloodSugar). Moreover, we construct a variable LongCons which is an
indicator for whether the consultation exceeds 20 minutes, a so-called prolonged consultation.
In addition, we also generate a variable TotalFee, which is the GPs total income (in NOK)
per consultation, including both the social insurance fee-for-service payment and patientsco-
payments.
The explanatory variable of prime interest is patientsSES, which is captured by education,
income, and ethnicity. Education is categorised in three levels; individuals with completed
compulsory schooling (Edu1 ), completed upper secondary education (Edu2), and completed
higher education (Edu3 ). Since younger patients may still be in education when observed, we
restrict the sample to patients aged 25 and above at the time of consultation. The majority of
patients are above 65 years of age. Changes in the educational system over time are taken into
account, so that the education indicators roughly reect an individuals education level relative
to his/her cohort. Income measures individualstotal income, including labour income, capital
income, and pensions. Finally, we categorise individuals according to ethnicity into three broad
groups; African, Asian, and others.17
When analysing the provision of health care to patients with di¤erent SES, it is important
to control for patient and GP characteristics that may inuence the choice of medical treatment.
Regarding patient characteristics, we control for age (PatAge), gender (PatMale), and include
two indicators for co-diagnosis; one for the patient having a heart problem (CoMoHeart) and
one for him/her having some other co-diagnosis (CoMoOther). We also include VisitsT90 and
OtherVisits representing the patientsnumber of visits per year related to diabetes and other
diagnosis, respectively. Finally, we include information about the number of enlisted patients
by the GPs (GPtotalnoPat) and whether the GP is a specialist in general medicine or not
17Ethnicity is based on the country of birth over three generations.
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(Specialist). A description of all variables used in the estimations is found in Table 1.
[ Table 1 here ]
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics at the GP level, where means are taken rst over each GPs
patient population and then across all GPs for each year from 2008 to 2012. The frequency of
prolonged consultations is fairly stable varying from 41 to 43 percent over the period. Concerning
medical tests, we observe a slight increase in the use of HbA1c tests per consultation from 53
to 57 percent, and slight decrease in the use of blood sugar tests per consultation from 47 to
44 percent. As expected given the rise in nominal fees, the GPstotal income per consultation
(TotalFee) has increased over the years studied.
Our prime interest is in the indicators of patients SES. The proportion of patients with
medium and high education is slightly increasing from 44 to 46 percent and from 16 to 18
percent, respectively, while the proportion of patients with low education is declining from 39
to 36 percent over the period. Patientsincome is increasing over the period from around NOK
300,000 to 350,000, which is mainly due wage ination. The proportions of patients with a
background from Africa or Asia are low but slightly increasing over the period. Patients with an
African background increases from 1 to 2 percent, whereas patients with an Asian background
increases from 6 to 7 percent.
In order to get a rst impression of how GP treatment varies by SES, we have split the sample
by patientslevel of education. This is shown in Table 2. We see that the GPstotal income per
consultation is increasing in the patientseducational level. This may suggest that patients with
higher SES receive more medical treatment than patients with lower SES. However, looking at
the specic services provided by the GPs, the descriptive statistics indicate a di¤erent mix of
services according to SES. Patients with high education tend to have more long consultations,
but fewer medical tests. Educational level is clearly correlated with income and ethnicity, as
well as patient age and gender, number of visits. Since these variables may inuence the GPs
provision of health care, it is important to control for them in the empirical analysis.
[ Table 2 here ]
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5 Empirical specication
Our interest is in the variation in GP services by patient SES within each GPs patient popula-
tion. Clearly, patient populations vary in many respects that may be relevant. This variation is
taken into account by including patient characteristics in the model. Although we benet from
a rich data set with GP characteristics, it is likely that unobservable characteristics of the GP
(for instance, communicative skills or risk aversion) have an inuence on GP practice patterns.
Our main specication is therefore a model with xed-e¤ects at the GP level as presented below,
where the subscripts i, k and t represent consultation, GP and year, respectively:
Yikt = 0 + 1SESikt + 2PATikt + 3GPkt + k + t + "ikt: (8)
The dependent variable Y captures the GPsmedical treatment measured by the frequency
of medical tests, the frequency of prolonged consultations, the number of visits, and the total
income per consultation. Our key explanatory variable SES includes patientseducational level,
total income and ethnicity. Patient characteristics are captured by the variable PAT , which
includes age, gender, co-morbidity, and the yearly number of visits. GP represents time-variant
GP characteristics, namely the number of patients enlisted and whether the GP is a specialist in
general medicine. Observable time-invariant GP characteristics (such as gender, year of birth,
o¢ ce location, etc.) is captured by the GP xed-e¤ect k, along with unobserved time-invariant
characteristics. t is a vector of indicators for the years 20082012 and "ikt is an error term.
The model is estimated with robust standard errors.
When estimating the relationship between patientsSES and the GPs provision of health
care, it is important to control for patient heterogeneity related to illness severity and thus
di¤erent need for medical treatment. It is well known that individuals with lower SES are,
on average, in worse health than those with higher SES. Thus, observing that patients with
low SES receive more health care does not necessarily imply that the GP systematically o¤er
better treatment to patients with lower SES. Our empirical strategy to deal with this issue is
two-fold. First, we limit our sample to one specic diagnosis which by denition implies less
unobserved heterogeneity in illness severity. Second, we include several variables that captures
observable heterogeneity among patients, such as age, gender, and two measures of comorbidity,
as explained above.
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For identication it is important with su¢ cient variation in patientsSES when using GP
xed e¤ects. Figure 1 shows for each GP the distribution of patients with low, medium and
high education, respectively.
[ Figure 1 here ]
We see that the large majority of GPs have patients in all educational categories.
6 Results
Our main interest is to analyse the GPs provision of health care according to the patients
SES. In particular, we want to test whether patients with lower SES receive systematically
less (or worse) medical treatment then patients with higher SES. In our empirical analysis we
investigate this relationship, while controlling for relevant factors other than SES that might
a¤ect the outcomes of interest; namely a number of GP and patient characteristics. Notably,
individual GPs unobserved characteristics are taken into account by xed-e¤ect models. Our
main results are reported in Table 3.
[ Table 3 here ]
From the table we see that patients with lower SES irrespective of whether this is measured as
education, income or ethnicity tend to generate lower income per consultation to the GPs. This
could be interpreted as GPs o¤ering less (or worse) services to patients with lower SES. However,
when we consider the specic services o¤ered to diabetes patients, we nd no clear evidence for
patients with lower SES receiving less (or worse) service from their GPs. In fact, the results
show that GPs tend to o¤er more (less) medical tests to patients with low (high) education and
more (less) prolonged consultations to patients with high (low) education. The same pattern is
present when considering ethnicity, where patients with an Asian or African background tend
to receive more medical tests but fewer prolonged consultations. These ndings are consistent
with our theory model where we show that when GPs are partially altruistic and the e¢ ciency
of communication is increasing in patients SES, then the optimal provision of health care can
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be to o¤er more medical tests but fewer prolonged consultations to patients with lower SES.18
However, the results regarding income shows a di¤erent pattern. Patients with lower income
tend to receive not only fewer prolonged consultations but also fewer medical tests. While
communication skills are likely to be positively correlated with patientseducational level and
ethnicity (due to, for instance, language), the association with income is much less apparent.
Thus, this may explain why patientsincome level has a di¤erent impact on the GPs provision
of medical care. Another issue is whether we can interpret this nding as evidence for a social
gradient in health care provision. While our results show that patients with lower income receive
less medical care per consultation, they also show that the same patients visit the GP more often.
Thus, whether patients with low income receive more or less medical care is an open question.
7 Sensitivity analysis
We check the sensitivity of our results with respect to patient and GP characteristics in several
ways. Regarding patient characteristics, we split the sample by patient age at age 67, which is
the formal retirement age in Norway. One reason for this is that the demand for health care
may be di¤erent before and after retirement according to patientsSES. In particular, patients
with high SES are likely to have a higher alternative cost (due to higher earnings) when in the
workforce, and thus visit the GPs less frequently than patients with a low SES. However, when
retired this alternative cost may be much more similar and thus not sensitive to SES. In Table
4 we report the key results related to SES when splitting the sample by patient age.19
[ Table 4 here ]
The table shows that the results are to a large extent qualitatively the same and thus not
sensitive to whether the patients are retired or not. In both age groups, patients with low
education receive more medical tests and fewer prolonged consultations. However, the results
regarding ethnicity change somewhat for patients above 67. In this age group, patients with an
African or Asian background receive less medical tests and fewer prolonged consultations. On
the other hand, patients with an Asian background have more visits. For patients below 67, the
18This result holds under the assumptions that consultations and testing are treatment substitutes and that
patient utility is not too concave in consultation length (see Proposition 1).
19 In Table A1 and A2 we report the full results from these estimations.
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results are similar to our main results reported in Table 3. Finally, our results show that low
income patients with age above 67 receive less prolonged consultations but not a signicantly
di¤erent number of medical tests than patients with higher income.
To investigate whether di¤erent groups of GPs treat patients di¤erently depending on patient
SES, we have estimated our empirical model, as specied in (8), on subsamples dened by GP
characteristics, for instance according to whether the GPs number of patients enlisted is above
or below the sample mean (longversus short list). Results are reported in Table 5. Here
patient age is among the control variables.20
[ Table 5 here ]
The most striking result is the homogeneity in the GP population: irrespective of GP age, gender,
specialist status, and number of patients enlisted, we nd that the higher is the patients level
of education, the higher is the probability of a prolonged consultation and the lower is the
probability of the tests taken.
8 Concluding remarks
In most countries we observe a positive relationship between SES and health; a phenomenon
often referred to as the social gradient. There are di¤erent explanations for this phenomenon
such as individual behaviour, environmental exposure, and the provision of health care. In
this paper we focus on the latter by studying the provision of health care by GPs to patients
according to their SES.
Having detailed register data on the services provided by the GPs to patients with dia-
betes over a ve-year period (2008-12), we nd no clear evidence for systematic over- or under-
treatment of patients with low SES. Instead, our results show that GPs tend to o¤er di¤erent
mix of services according to patientsSES. We nd that patients with low education receive
more medical tests but fewer prolonged consultations. The same pattern is present for patients
with African or Asian background. These results are highly robust and based on a regression
model with GP xed e¤ects, where we also control for a wide set of observable GP and patient
characteristics.
20The full estimation result, showing all variables, is available from the authors upon request.
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To develop economic intuition for the empirical ndings, we consider a theory model with a
GP that o¤ers two types of treatment (medical testing and consultation) to patients who derive
utility from health gains generated by the treatment. Assuming that the quality of consultation
increases with the patientsSES (due to, for instance, communication skills), our theory model
is consistent with the empirical ndings if the GPs are partially altruistic and medical testing
and consultation are either substitute or independent treatments.
In contrast to the results on education and ethnicity, we nd that patients with low income
tend to receive less medical testing and also fewer prolonged consultations. However, while
education and ethnicity are likely to inuence the quality of consultation due to communicative
skills, income is less likely to play a role in this respect. This may explain the di¤erence in the
results. Another issue is whether the results regarding income can be considered as evidence
for a social gradient in the health care provision. While this may be the case, we also nd that
patients with low income visit the GP more often. Thus, it is unclear whether patients with
lower income receive less health care when accounting for the fact that they visit the GPs more
often than patients with higher income.
To conclude, we nd no systematic evidence for a social gradient in the provision of health
care by the GPs, but rather that the GPs di¤erentiate the services o¤ered to patients according
to their SES. A natural implication from our ndings is that the provision of health care by
the GPs is not likely to reinforce the positive relationship between SES and health inequalities.
Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to test whether the di¤erentiation of services provided
by the GPs to patients with di¤erent SES actually contributes to reducing the health inequalities
related to SES. This is a question of great importance, which we leave for future research.
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
 
Figure 1. Frequency of low, medium and high educated diabetes patients at GP level, 2010. 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics, at GP level (means with standard deviations in parentheses) 
     2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Dependent variables      
LongCons 1 if the consultation is prolonged 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.42 0.43 
HbA1c 1 if test of glycated haemoglobin is taken 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.57 
Bloodsugar 1 if test of glucose is taken 0.47 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.44 
VisitsT90 Number of visits per year, T90 main diagnosis 3.85 (1.49) 3.79 (1.38) 3.82 (1.35) 3.77 (1.38) 3.74 (1.44) 
TotalFee GP’s total remuneration per consultation (NOK) 389.29 (84.93) 401.35 (88.35) 408.04 (105.76) 420.39 (91.00) 434.24 (93.12) 
 
Patient information 
     
Education (baseline: patients with higher education) 
Educ1 1 if compulsory school only 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.36 
Educ2 1 if upper secondary education 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.46 
Income (baseline: patients with income higher than the yearly sample mean) 
LowInc 1 if income is lower than the sample mean 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 
Ethnicity (baseline: patients with Norwegian, European or American background) 
Africa 1 if patient has African background 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Asia 1 if patient has Asian background 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
PatAge Patient age 63.24 (5.57) 63.31 (5.34) 63.46 (5.40) 63.41 (5.37) 63.47 (5.33) 
PatMale 1 if patient is male 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 
CoMoHarth 1 if secondary diagnosis is within chapter K (cardiovascular) 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.12 
CoMoOther 1 if other secondary diagnosis 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.18 
OtherVisits Number of visits per year, other main diagnoses 3.56 (1.88) 0.68 (0.24) 3.63 (1.76) 3.68 (1.87) 3.72 (1.81) 
 
GP information 
     
GPAge Age of the GP 49.17 (9.73) 49.31 (9.94) 49.50 (10.24) 49.55 (10.43) 49.57 (10.59) 
GPMale 1 if the GP is male 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 
Specialist 1 if the GP is certified as a specialist in  0.63 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.63 
ListLength Number of patients on GPs list (in 100) 12.03 (3.99) 12.02 (3.96) 11.92 (4.01) 11.85 (3.98) 11.82 (3.88) 
VisitsPerDay Number of consultations per day 14.93 (4.83) 14.94 (4.84) 15.00 (4.72) 15.14 (4.76) 15.05 (4.72) 
Number of GPs 3647 3729 3843 3936 4007 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, by patient SES (means with standard deviations in parentheses) 
 Low education Medium education High education 
Dependent variables: 
      LongCons 0.37 0.40 0.43 
HbA1c 0.61 0.62 0.60 
BloodSugar 0.52 0.52 0.49 
VisitsT90 4.37 (3.29) 4.15 (2.86) 4.00 (2.72) 
TotalFee 420.20 (171.82) 428.59 (171.61) 432.81 (175.28) 
Patient characteristics:    
Income 0.82 0.58 0.32 
Africa 0.02 0.01 0.03 
Asia 0.08 0.03 0.11 
PatAge 65.87 (13.78) 63.74 (12.57) 60.59 (12.93) 
PatMale 0.47 0.59 0.62 
CoMoHearth 0.14 0.15 0.13 
CoMoOther 0.18 0.18 0.18 
OtherVisits 3.84 (4.97) 3.46 (4.39) 3.26 (4.21) 
Number of consultations 510 376 604 147 212 938 
  
 
Table 3. Patient SES and content of GP consultations, full estimation results. Fixed-effect estimator. 
 LongCons HbA1c BloodSugar VisitsT90 TotalFee 
Educ1 -0.0534*** 0.0208*** 0.0288*** 0.3227*** -5.4799*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0075) (0.4416) 
      
Educ2 -0.0282*** 0.0164*** 0.0194*** 0.1702*** -3.0333*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0067) (0.4103) 
      
LowInc -0.0293*** -0.0055*** -0.0049*** 0.1990*** -2.0974*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0057) (0.3260) 
      
Africa -0.0932*** -0.0026 0.0096** -0.0870*** -18.1823*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0213) (1.3460) 
      
Asia -0.0930*** 0.0046* 0.0105*** 0.1451*** -15.8308*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0118) (0.6567) 
      
PatAge -0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** -0.0098*** -0.1049*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0112) 
      
PatMale -0.0059*** -0.0013 0.0003 0.0538*** 0.7802** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0051) (0.2842) 
      
CoMoHeart 0.0751*** 0.0280*** 0.0150*** -0.6502*** 35.4573*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0069) (0.4393) 
      
CoMoOther 0.0891*** -0.0083*** -0.0177*** -0.3780*** 41.9801*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0067) (0.4173) 
      
VisitsT90 -0.0031*** -0.0129*** -0.0053***  -4.3038*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  (0.0494) 
      
OtherVisits -0.0008*** -0.0128*** -0.0088*** 0.0238*** -1.3554*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0320) 
      
ListLength -0.0063*** 0.0044*** 0.0038*** -0.0169*** -0.1601 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0030) (0.1716) 
      
Specialist -0.0210*** -0.0026 -0.0185*** 0.0615*** 68.2408*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0168) (0.9858) 
      
Constant 0.5879*** 0.5941*** 0.4884*** 4.8108*** 380.6936*** 
 (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0438) (2.5071) 
GP dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consultations 1327461 1327461 1327461 1327461 1327461 
GPs 4726 4726 4726 4726 4726 
R2 0.187 0.313 0.377 0.196 0.241 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Patient SES and content of GP consultations, by patient age. Fixed-effect estimator. 
 LongCons HbA1c BloodSugar VisitsT90 TotalFee 
A. Patients aged 25-66 (747 593 consultations) 
Educ1 -0.0567*** 0.0195*** 0.0294*** 0.3843*** -6.3080*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0099) (0.5662) 
      
Educ2 -0.0324*** 0.0172*** 0.0198*** 0.1698*** -4.0257*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0085) (0.5180) 
      
LowInc -0.0318*** -0.0079*** -0.0063*** 0.2617*** -1.6936*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0072) (0.4141) 
      
Africa -0.0820*** 0.0051 0.0167*** -0.0108 -15.7092*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0232) (1.4656) 
      
Asia -0.0825*** 0.0095*** 0.0145*** 0.1592*** -14.4602*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0133) (0.7415) 
B. Patients aged 67 or above (579 868 consultations) 
Educ1 -0.0477*** 0.0221*** 0.0262*** 0.2573*** -3.3549*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0117) (0.7505) 
      
Educ2 -0.0219*** 0.0141*** 0.0171*** 0.1798*** -0.9414 
 (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0110) (0.7048) 
      
LowInc -0.0224*** -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0439*** -2.6609*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0092) (0.5574) 
      
Africa -0.1504*** -0.0432*** -0.0484*** -0.6232*** -40.4956*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0500) (3.4859) 
      
Asia -0.1374*** -0.0214*** -0.0176*** 0.1232*** -25.5048*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0280) (1.6309) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
  
Table 5. Patient SES and content of GP consultation, GP heterogeneity. Fixed effect estimator. 
 Female GP Male GP GP aged >=50 GP aged <50 Not specialist Specialist Long list Short list 
(I). Dep. variable: Long consultations      
Edu1 0.0244*** -0.0540*** -0.0531*** -0.0538*** -0.0493*** -0.0548*** -0.0486*** -0.0582*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
Edu2 0.0554*** -0.0283*** -0.0268*** -0.0293*** -0.0251*** -0.0293*** -0.0252*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
LowInc 0.0005*** -0.0299*** -0.0300*** -0.0288*** -0.0255*** -0.0307*** -0.0329*** -0.0254*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
(II). Dep. variable: HbA1c test       
Edu1 0.0234*** 0.0199*** 0.0185*** 0.0222*** 0.0204*** 0.0209*** 0.0202*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0017) 
Edu2 0.0157*** 0.0165*** 0.0164*** 0.0165*** 0.0152*** 0.0168*** 0.0166*** 0.0164*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
LowInc 0.0008 -0.0071*** -0.0043** -0.0062*** -0.0064*** -0.0051*** -0.0089*** -0.0022 
 (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
(III). Dep. variable: Blood sugar test       
Edu1 0.0267*** 0.0293*** 0.0233*** 0.0321*** 0.0245*** 0.0304*** 0.0309*** 0.0265*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Edu2 0.0174*** 0.0199*** 0.0183*** 0.0202*** 0.0147*** 0.0212*** 0.0223*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
LowInc -0.0033 -0.0054*** -0.0032* -0.0063*** -0.0059*** -0.0044*** -0.0072*** -0.0025* 
 (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
(IV). Dep. variable: VisitsT90       
Edu1 0.3381*** 0.3184*** 0.3444*** 0.3086*** 0.3082*** 0.3296*** 0.3483*** 0.3035*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0087) (0.0122) (0.0095) (0.0139) (0.0090) (0.0110) (0.0103) 
Edu2 0.1253*** 0.1819*** 0.2052*** 0.1497*** 0.2169*** 0.1516*** 0.1573*** 0.1824*** 
 (0.0134) (0.0078) (0.0110) (0.0085) (0.0130) (0.0079) (0.0096) (0.0094) 
LowInc 0.2442*** 0.1871*** 0.1867*** 0.2061*** 0.2129*** 0.1934*** 0.2086*** 0.1903*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0066) (0.0095) (0.0072) (0.0104) (0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0077) 
(V). Dep. variable: Total fee       
Edu1 -6.1830*** -5.2619*** -5.8459*** -5.2331*** -5.4020*** -5.5166*** -4.3358*** -6.5771*** 
 (0.9646) (0.4956) (0.7730) (0.5335) (0.8630) (0.5134) (0.6092) (0.6421) 
Edu2 -5.3193*** -2.3905*** -3.3027*** -2.8380*** -3.5054*** -2.8591*** -2.1674*** -3.9524*** 
 (0.9079) (0.4591) (0.7256) (0.4941) (0.8206) (0.4728) (0.5596) (0.6036) 
LowInc 0.1528 -2.7188*** -2.0209*** -2.2298*** -1.2878* -2.3948*** -3.1431*** -1.0803* 
 (0.7061) (0.3675) (0.5663) (0.3968) (0.6219) (0.3819) (0.4611) (0.4607) 
N 293 837 1 033 624 832 853 494 608 396 082 931 379 636 803 690 658 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
APPENDIX  
Table A1. Content of GP consultations for diabetes patients, GP fixed-effects estimators with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Patients aged 25-66. 
 LongCons HbA1c BloodSugar VisitsT90 TotalFee 
Educ1 -0.0567*** 0.0195*** 0.0294*** 0.3843*** -6.3080*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0099) (0.5662) 
      
Educ2 -0.0324*** 0.0172*** 0.0198*** 0.1698*** -4.0257*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0085) (0.5180) 
      
LowInc -0.0318*** -0.0079*** -0.0063*** 0.2617*** -1.6936*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0072) (0.4141) 
      
Africa -0.0820*** 0.0051 0.0167*** -0.0108 -15.7092*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0232) (1.4656) 
      
Asia -0.0825*** 0.0095*** 0.0145*** 0.1592*** -14.4602*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0133) (0.7415) 
      
PatAge -0.0004*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** -0.0069*** 0.0989*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0218) 
      
PatMale -0.0003 0.0036*** 0.0087*** 0.0367*** 2.3159*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0071) (0.3957) 
      
CoMoHeart 0.0756*** 0.0225*** 0.0100*** -0.6660*** 33.0930*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0100) (0.6328) 
      
CoMoOther 0.0763*** -0.0162*** -0.0257*** -0.3398*** 41.9749*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0090) (0.5617) 
      
VisitsT90 -0.0027*** -0.0113*** -0.0039***  -4.1991*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0654) 
      
OtherVisits -0.0010*** -0.0118*** -0.0081*** 0.0304*** -1.4426*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0443) 
      
ListLength -0.0050*** 0.0046*** 0.0039*** -0.0123** -0.0814 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0040) (0.2249) 
      
Specialist -0.0196*** -0.0003 -0.0158*** 0.0839*** 69.8105*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0226) (1.3263) 
      
Constant 0.5553*** 0.5298*** 0.4348*** 4.5138*** 367.2982*** 
 (0.0098) (0.0092) (0.0089) (0.0595) (3.3756) 
GP dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consultations 747593 747593 747593 747593 747593 
GPs 4708 4708 4708 4708 4708 
R2 0.183 0.305 0.371 0.208 0.230 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2. Content of GP consultations for diabetes patients, GP fixed-effects estimators with robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Patients aged 67 years and above. 
 LongCons HbA1c BloodSugar VisitsT90 TotalFee 
Educ1 -0.0477*** 0.0221*** 0.0262*** 0.2573*** -3.3549*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0117) (0.7505) 
      
Educ2 -0.0219*** 0.0141*** 0.0171*** 0.1798*** -0.9414 
 (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0110) (0.7048) 
      
LowInc -0.0224*** -0.0002 -0.0006 0.0439*** -2.6609*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0092) (0.5574) 
      
Africa -0.1504*** -0.0432*** -0.0484*** -0.6232*** -40.4956*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0500) (3.4859) 
      
Asia -0.1374*** -0.0214*** -0.0176*** 0.1232*** -25.5048*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0280) (1.6309) 
      
PatAge -0.0010*** -0.0006*** -0.0000 -0.0083*** -0.2081*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0304) 
      
PatMale -0.0126*** -0.0078*** -0.0110*** 0.0703*** -1.1593** 
 (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0073) (0.4189) 
      
CoMoHeart 0.0765*** 0.0339*** 0.0207*** -0.6187*** 37.2342*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0094) (0.6298) 
      
CoMoOther 0.1087*** 0.0036* -0.0055*** -0.4189*** 42.0949*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0095) (0.6219) 
      
VisitsT90 -0.0039*** -0.0158*** -0.0076***  -4.6179*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)  (0.0781) 
      
OtherVisits -0.0004*** -0.0137*** -0.0095*** 0.0094*** -1.2551*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0475) 
      
ListLength -0.0079*** 0.0042*** 0.0036*** -0.0261*** -0.2069 
 (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0043) (0.2663) 
      
Specialist -0.0224*** -0.0070 -0.0228*** 0.0154 65.5614*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0243) (1.4764) 
 
0.6246*** 0.6950*** 0.5668*** 5.0260*** 391.0425*** 
Constant (0.0134) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0722) (4.3596) 
GP dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Consultations 579868 579868 579868 579868 579868 
GPs 4672 4672 4672 4672 4672 
R2 0.210 0.337 0.398 0.260 0.268 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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